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A NATION IN AGONY: THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE FOR SOLIDARITY, 
FREEDOM AND JUSTICE
By Reginald Herbcld Green and Jean de la Paix
We do not believe in a system that sells people.
- Striking 'Contract' Workers (1971)
Namibia's history of the past century is unforgiving ...
It is a virtually unrelieved record of theft and violence, 
blood and iron - African blood shed by European iron.
- From Sudwestafrika to Namibia (1981)
We are outcasts in our own country 
We ask
A dwelling place of our own.
- Chief Hosea Kutako (1970)
It must be borne in mind that the Namibian people are
shedding blood to liberate each and every inch of the 
Namibian soil, thus each and every inch of the Namibian 
land must and will belong to the Namibian people.
- Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO (1979)
TIME PRESENT AND TIME PAST IN TRAVAIL
April 1982: Symbols, Contradictions and Signposts
Easter comes in the fall in Namibia,but March/April is nonetheless 
a key period in the natural cycle, a time of rain and the promise 
of grazing and crops, or of hot dry days and the threat of famine. 
In March 1982 the rains came breaking a drought that had held 
most of the land in its grip since 1978. But on the social front 
the drought continued. Vagrancy laws and employer 'solidarity' 
have replaced pass laws and monopoly recruitment to herd single 
African men, torn from their families into prison-like concrete 
barracks; the black population of Windhoek, the capital, continued 
(except for a few favoured collaborators of the occupation regime) 
to be confined to the ghetto suburb of Katatura (whose very name
in the regional language means "the place we do not want to be").
United Nations Secretary General Miguel de Cuellar in his first 
major address placed high priority on achieving the early and 
genuine independence of Namibia. The confirmation of Marti Ahtisaari 
as his Special Representative and the separate appointment of 
Dr Mishra as new Commissioner for Namibia (underlining the UN's 
legal, if not actual status as interim sovereign authority over 
Namibia) demonstrated the reality of his concern. But no such 
concern with speed or result could be seen in the Western Contact 
Group's negotiations with South Africa, SWAPO and the Front Line 
States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). 
The Five (USA, UK, Federal Germany, Canada, France)'s apparent
determination to mollify the illegal occupier, South Africa, first, 
and see about freeing the victims after, and its tortuous complex 
procedural discussions amply earned the appellation "Operation 
Pussyfoot" given by a member of the British Council of Churches' 
November 1981 delegation to Namibia, Sister Catherine Hughes.
Patterns of Violence and of Hope
South Africa, unable to prevent SWAPO from organising in Namibia 
or PLAN finding civilian support, continued to strike into Angola 
and to create the military cover behind which it is desperately 
trying to create a puppet state of the broken remnants of UNITA 
and the black mercenary forces of Portugese East A.frica and Rhodesia.
* Katatura is so named because the African population of Windhoek 
was forcibly moved there (and the 'Colored' to the separate 
satellite ghetto of Khomasdal) from the multi-racial Windhoek 
"Old Location" over 1959-68. That bitterly resisted forced move­
ment (analagous to the parallel destruction of the similar 
Johannesburg community of Sophiatown which led to Archbishop 
Trevor Huddleston's Naught for your comfort) opened with the 
December 10 1959 massacre of peacefully protesting residents - 
Namibia's Sharpeville.
But the hopeless less of this policy was shown by SWAPO's mounting 
its most intensive campaign to date in the Grootfontein-Otavi-Tsumeb 
triangle - 300 kilometres south of the Angolan border.
The dead hand of the colonial economy and the febrile 'initiatives' 
of the desperate DTA puppet regime lay heavy on the land. Fleeing 
ranchers, hesitating mining companies, over $200 million (an eighth 
of GDP) to bribe farmers to stay on their ranches (and join the 
'home guard') and blacks to work for the bantustans and the DTA 
organs, a devastated fishing industry, and a sense of doom illus­
trated by the supposed Chief Minister Dirk Mudge repeatedly lashing 
out that South Africa was talking behind his back ana would sell him 
dov/n the river (or perhaps more aptly into the sands) - these were 
among the vignettes of the end of an era. Meanwhile SWAPO, the 
United Nations Institute for Namibia and invited experts met in 
Lusaka to examine alternatives and work out strategies and policies 
for political economic transition, rehabilitation and development 
in full confidence that working out charts for the future was their 
responsibility to the Namibian people.
Bullying and Bravery
The shadow over that future was made brutally plain in March, when 
Prime Minister Piet Wappen ("Pete the Gun") Botha met in Windhoek 
with the leaders of the Namibian Council of Churches. When the 
bishops, moderates and pastors pressed him for South African with­
drawal he did indeed say that if the pressure continued South Africa 
would leave. But he went on to say that South Africa would take 
everything it had 'made' and would destroy the buildings, bridges, 
and mines it could not take. The Christian leaders answer was 
clear and blunt - nothing could be worse than your presence, go 
now. Botha stormed out of the meeting. Small wonder that the
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NCC Executive Secretary Albertus Maasdorp says on behalf of the 
churches "SWAPO are our children",or that Sister Hughes comments 
"It was very hard to see how Christians could be anything but 
pro-SWAPO".
The symbols of change, the violent contradiction, the signposts to 
the future of Namibia are starkly and speedily visible to those who 
care to look. But a fuller understanding requires a deeper acquain­
tance with Namibia's tragic history, its unforgiving natural ecology, 
its colonial political economy of theft, the particular forms in 
which South African apartheid has cast these historical and struc­
tural characteristics and the nature of the liberation struggle of 
the Namibian people and the leadership they have chosen, and follow 
to prison, to death and to victory.
Contributions to Knowledge, Calls to Action
Four volumes have appeared in the second half of 1981 which go far 
to giving the intepretations and the facts to allow a fuller com­
prehension of Namibia, Namibians and SWAPO of Namibia. The first - 
To Be Born A Nation (Zed Press, London, 1981) - is an official 
SWAPO publication which puts the history of oppression and resis­
tance, exploitation and the struggle for liberation clearly, 
coherently and lucidly with substantial bodies of detailed data 
and quotations from Namibian workers, churches and its own key 
statements.
The second - From Sudwestafrika to Namibia (Scandinavian Institute 
of African Studies, research report no. 58, Uppsala, 1981 by R.H. 
Green) - is an up-to-date political economic survey set against the 
historical background and looking to a future in which progress
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toward solidarity, liberation and justice could be achieved.
The third - Namibia in the 1980's (Catholic Institute for Inter­
national Relations/British Council of Churches, London, 1981) - is 
the first in a monograph series prepared in close consultation with 
Christian and secular Namibian bodies. It surveys the background 
to, course of and future requirements of the Liberation Struggle 
in broad terms. More specific studies in the near future will 
cover the subordination and struggle for liberation of Namibian 
women and the ecology, political economy and agronomy of Namibian 
agriculture from 1800 to date, and looking into the future.
The fourth - Namibia - The Last Colony (Longman, Harlow, Essex,
1981 edited by R.H. Green, M-L Kiijunen and K. Kiljunen) - is an 
integrated set of political economic, social and political studies 
of Namibia supported by the most complete set of statistical esti­
mates yet available for Namibia.
None of these volumes is neutral - their authors clearly see any 
such stance in respect to Namibia as immoral. But each is analy­
tical, factual and reasoned. They provide a rich array of quali­
tative, quantitative and historical data,and from it argue their 
cases - the reader is able to judge them for himself.
SWAPO, 1960 - 1980
The colonisation of Namibia was late but brutal. Most remembered 
is the deliberate campaign of genocide waged by the German colonial 
power between 1904 and 1908, which killed more than half the people 
in the war area - over three-quarters of the Herero and over half 
the Nama and Damara perished in battle, in the waterless desert or 
in concentration camps. But there is also a tradition of popular
tresistance, repeatedly contained, beaten back and suppressed (for 
the total population of Namibia is even today less than one and a 
half million, and scattered), but continuous. After the Second 
World War, resistance was manifested initially in petitioning the 
UN, and increasingly by strikes and go-slows by the contract workers 
in Namibia's mines, fish plants and settler ranches. It was in 
opposition to contract work that the Ovamboland People's Organisa­
tion was founded in 1957 (transformed into SWAPO in 1960), with 
contract workers and students forming its base. (A second movement, 
SWANU, was also influential in the early 1960's, but its support 
fell as it failed to develop a mass worker and peasant base or a 
truly national membership).
The early 1960's saw SWAPO establishing branches round the country, 
calling for national unity and self-reliance and pressing the UN 
to assert its legal authority over the territory. Namibians lis­
tened and joined, but the world community would not respond. In the 
words of Toivo ja Toivo's speech in the dock (reprinted in To Be 
3orn a Nation) "My organisation could not work properly - it could 
not even hold meetings. I had to answer to the question: 'Where
has your non-violence got us?' Whilst the /I966/ World Court 
judgement was pending, I at least had that to fall back on. When 
we failed, after years of waiting, I had no answer to give to my 
people." The month after the judgement, the first armed clash took 
place between SWAPO guerrillas and South African troops.
Armed struggle formed an important part of SWAPO's operation in 
the 1970's, particularly after the collapse of the Portugese empire 
in neighbouring Angola. South African forces have increased in 
response, to perhaps 100,000 men today, and their tactics of terror 
are detailed in these books. More recently the Christian Council
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of Namibia has told the Prime Minister of South Africa "We know 
of the killing of innocent people, of the wanton destruction of 
property and of beatings, detention, solitary confinement and 
torture of the local population." The north of the country lives 
under nightly curfew, in a war zone.
The 1970's were equally critically a decade when widespread organised 
national opposition reasserted itself. In 1971/72 an extraordinary 
general strike of contract workers against the very existence of 
the contract labour system was maintained for two months, linking 
the urban areas of the south with rural labour reserves from which 
the workers were recruited. In 1973 98% of the electorate in 
Ovamboland responded to a SWAPO call to boycott elections for the 
bantustan Council. 1976/7 students boycotted classes and examina­
tions. When SWAPO public meetings were permitted, huge crowds 
turned out. The depth of support for SWAPO has been conceded 
several times by the South African authorities themselves, esti­
mating it would win over half the votes in a free election.
SWAPO1s organisational base among students, workers, peasants, 
women and its relation of solidarity with Namibia's churches is 
national, and in depth, despite two decades of South African 
efforts to stifle its growth. General Geldenhuys admitted this 
when he warned that to term PLAN terrorists was to misunderstand 
fatally, they were guerillas with a broad civilian support base, 
and with clear objectives to which military action was an end, not 
isolated militants for whom violence was an end in itself.
Similarly SWAPO has built up a substantial civil government capacity 
in three senses. First, it provides basic services and a democratic 
community structure for over 50,000 refugees in Angola and Zambia
and - less completely - for Namibians in semi-liberated areas 
where South African civil rule has vanished and troops venture 
rarely. Second, it has developed a large scale education programme 
from creche to postgraduate to build up the cadres for an indepen­
dent Namibia. At upper secondary and tertiary level this external 
programme substantially exceedes the scale of training provided by 
the South African occupation regime. Finally, SWAPO is building up 
data and analysis leading to a dialogue on transitional and indepen­
dence planning over a wide range of social and economic strategies, 
policies, institutions and projects. In March 1981 the Windhoek 
Observer sharply contrasted what it saw as the vitality, creative­
ness and vision of SWAPO's educational work and forward planning 
with the stale, intellectual bankrupt, self-serving palliatives 
and bribes of the DTA administration.
Meanwhile the diplomatic activity of SWAEO outside Namibia has 
been directed to securing international support for its struggle 
for liberation, attempting to persuade the United Nations to 
implement its decision to revoke South Africa's mandate, and 
securing resources to carry on its civilian services for refugees 
and in semi-liberated zones, as well as training personpower and 
carrying out research toward post-independence development.
The United Nations
In 1966 the General Assembly of the United Nations formally revoked
South Africa's mandate to govern Namibia (which stemmed from the
*reallocation of German colonies after World War One ), a decision
* The Mandate was granted to the British Crown to be exercised on 
its behalf by the then Union of South Africa. Arguably it was 
voided by South Africa's leaving the Commonwealth in 1961. Both 
SWAPO and the Commonwealth clearly view Namibia as a Commonwealth 
territory illegally taken out by South Africa, and to become a 
full member on independence.
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eventually confirmed by a nearly unanmious International Court of 
Justice in 1971. "State members of the United Nations are under 
obligation to recognise the illegality of South Africa's presence 
in Namibia," the Court declared. Formal responsibility was passed 
to a UN Council for Namibia, which has issued a number of Decrees, 
the first banning exports of Namibian natural resources without 
the Council's authorisation.
However, this Decree remains a dead letter and South Africa in con­
trol while the key Western countries refuse to implement sanctions 
or other measures to compel a withdrawal. Instead, five Western 
members formed a Contact Group, (widely termed 'The Gang of Five') 
to negotiate a transition to independence, and in 1978 their out­
line proposals for an election under United Nations supervision 
followed by independence were approved by the United Nations 
Security Council in Resolution 435. The implementation of Resolu­
tion 435 became a central part of SWAPO policy. Since then negotia­
tions have continued over the mechanics of implementation. Namibia 
in the 1980's details their course up to the end of 1981. Stripped 
of the breathless meeting watching by the international press, it 
is a sorry tale. There have been cycles consisting almost entirely 
of South African objections coinciding with heavy military attacks 
into Angola, followed by SWAPO concessions met with further South 
African objections. But Resolution 435 does still remain intact, 
as a potentially viable and internationally acceptable way forward. 
In the meanwhile, the United Nations has established with SWAPO 
a major Nationhood Programme to train Namibians, and to build up 
a data and analytical base for independence.
South Africa
South Africa's post 1945 course towards the incorporation of 
Namibia as a fifth Province was reversed in the mid 1970's by rising 
international hostility mobilised by SWAPO, and extending even to 
the Republic's western friends, and by Portugal's collapse in 
seeking to prevent the liberation of Angola and Mozambique. A 
parallel short-term response was intensified military control. For 
the longer term, by 1977 South Africa was proposing, at the 
'Turnhalle Conference' a neo-colonial solution - indeed a "Franken­
stein monster" as Namibia in the 1980's puts it: eleven ethnic 
governments (with "tribal" not territorial definition of coverage) 
under a multi-ethnic central government and solid de facto white 
control. The books reviewed here are all agreed that this is not 
in practice a viable solution - the level of popular opposition 
and the minute size of any black middle class that might benefit 
from collaboration mean that South African troops would have to 
remain. The 1982 split in South Africa's protegee, the DTA, con­
firms their view, as does the remarkably unimpressive performance 
put up by the puppet members of the South African delegation at 
the 1981 Geneva Pre-Implementation Talks.
South Africa is unlikely to give up. It has had a triple strategy 
- building a neocolonial state apparatus of departments, police and 
armed forces; engaging in negotiations with the UN so that "an 
image has been sustained of something really taking place or talks 
reaching a real breakthrough" (NLC) - which, if nothing else, buys 
time; seeking to withdraw at a time and on terms entailing cost 
with the greatest possible remaining benefits even if this does 
mean accepting a genuinely national government. There are reasons 
why South Africa might in the end acquiesce in a genuine election -
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Namibia is not strategically essential, the cost of the war now 
exceeds receipts from Namibia, and white soldiers being killed 
unsettles the volk back home. But domestic political concerns pull 
in the other direction: the psychological impact withdrawal would 
have - on both the black and white communities - in South Africa 
itself; P.W. Botha's weakness in respect to the two major Afrikaaner 
parties to his right following the recent split in the Nationalist 
Party; the uses of an external hot war to underline the need for 
volk solidarity and a "total /national security state/ strategy" 
as well as for training troops and police in combatting guerillas 
and political mobilisation, not to speak of the advantages of a 
military training ground. In practice there is no need yet for 
South Africa to stop playing for time, for its power of military 
respression is enormous and, as To Be Born a Nation warns, the 
liberation struggle advances "slowly, grimly, with great sacrifice." 
Only outside pressure can accelerate the process.
The Western Contact Group
The interest of the Contact Group ('Gang of Five1) of USA, UK, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany and Canada is a country so 
thinly populated as Namibia is at first sight surprising. There 
are some - such as Senator Jesse Helms and the US Congress Sub­
committee on Security and Terrorism - who argue that Western 
interests are best served by standing by South Africa as a bastion 
against the spread of communism in Africa, as 'represented' in 
Namibia by SWAPO. However, the alternative view associated with 
US Under-Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker and which 
prevails at present, is that the voice of trading partners in Africa 
cannot be ignored, that communism is better fought by establishing 
good relations with both South Africa and friendly African states -
and that this is not possible unless the West is seen to be making 
efforts to remove the last colonial sore on the continent.
The method chosen, however, (or perhaps, therefore) is immensely 
time-consuming. A Contact Group mission tours African capitals to 
consult- a formal proposal is then drawn up by the Contact Group 
and presented to both sides; reactions are awaited; a revised pro­
posal is presented. Between each stage weeks elapse. It can 
degenerate into "diplomacy by wheeze" - in mid-December 1981 a 
ludicrously cumbersome and confusing dual proportional/constituency 
system of voting was introduced as a revised proposal, which would 
clearly meet objections from parties committed to one man, one vote. 
Once South Africa accepted it, the Contact Group pressed SWAPO to 
concur - alteration was first deemed impossible without allowing 
South Africa to reopen many other issues, and then made half-way 
only. As a result, April 1982 was reached with no progress.
Amazingly Chester Crocker asserted that SWAPO and the Front Line 
States (who stand ready to accept either a national proportional 
list system or - subject to an impartial census - a constituency 
one) were obstructing a settlement. Both SWAPO and the FLS sadly 
pointed out that Resolution 345 itself was a compromise means to 
end an illegal occupation, that since then SWAPO and the FLS have 
accepted a large number of amendments to "reassure" South Africa, 
while South Africa has yielded on none of the terms of 345 or sub­
sequent proposals less than optimal for SWAPO and the FLS, and that 
it would be more convincing if the Contact Group were to pressure 
South Africa than its victims.
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However, such pressure would now have cracks in the South African 
ruling elite on which to press. The business community wants the 
war in Namibia ended - it believes it can do business even with a 
nationalist government, and sees high military costs and insecurity 
as worsening its prospects in Namibia, at home and in other indepen­
dent African states, The military high command is shifting to the 
view that the Namibian war cannot be won, and poses risks of 
unhandleable escalation and/or diversion of forces needed at heme. 
The Afrikaaner intellectual, professional, theological and business 
elite is splitting - witness the Progressive Federal Party's cap­
ture of Randfontein (an upper income, high education Afrikaaner 
influential residential suburb) in 1982, and the boer students at 
Potchefstroom University who shouted Prime Minister Botha down
in 1981 with left challenges. There is a real debate on what to 
do about Namibia, even within the Afrikaaner volk, and how it is 
resolved will largely determine when and if South agrees to inter­
nationally supervised transition to constitution writing, and with 
what conditions. Only pressure, not concessions on "entrenched 
clauses" (which the Afrikaaner lenders do not believe in, having 
carefully ripped them out of their own Constitution), still less 
complicity in time-wasting 'technical' objections and requests for 
'clarification', can have a positive impact on that dialogue's out­
come. Even the most reasonable and patient of FLS leaders are 
losing both patience and faith in the Gang of Five's goodsense or 
goodwill. A recent speech warned against making no choice between 
white oppressor and black victim, occupation and liberation, ter­
rorism and self-defence, good and evil. It clearly paraphrased and 
rejected Crocker's 1981 Honolulu speech on even-handedness and
impartiality,echoing Dante's condemnation of those who in a time of 
moral crisis refuse to take the great decision between good and
evil.
To Namibians, "killing time" in negotiations means killing people, 
as the various church statements in Namibia in the 1980's illustrate. 
It also erodes the chances for a positive transition when the time 
comes. At a psychological level, a military occupation and a war 
breed bitterness, callousness and division. At a practical level, 
the further the South Africans proceed with the construction of 
an artificial neo-colonial state, the more difficult it will be to 
construct a state serving the people after independence: the new 
"South West Africa Defence Force" and Police will have to be 
integrated or disbanded; the small but significant number of 
Namibians enriched (by corruption or otherwise) in the new ethnic 
authorities stimulate both contempt of administration and unrealis­
tic expectations of wealth. Meanwhile the economy moves deeper 
into crisis as drought, present insecurity, future uncertainty, 
ecologically unsound production patterns, global recession and 
South African depression perpetuate the collapse of fishing, 
deepen the fissures in the crumbling ranching sector, erode the 
mineral core of production and add to the backlog of required 
infrastructure and services not provided.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THEFT
"By appointment to the playboys and power merchants of the 
world"
Diamond jewelry, high fashion karakul coats, lobster tails, 
uranium oxide for nuclear power plants - the main products 
of South African occupied Namibia. Or rather, for this is a 
colony 'par excellence', the raw materials come from Namibia; 
the jewelry, coats and power station fuel rods are made up 
outside. If there ever was a poor country with an economy, 
"by appointment to the playboys of the world", this is it. 
With the addition of uranium(and atomic power is basically 
another item for the rich) they account for three quarters 
of exports and two thirds of production of goods excluding 
services. The contrast with the needs and consumption of 
Namibians themselves could hardly be more stark. Even in 
the case of the two major products - meat and fish - directly 
relevant to Namibian mass needs the same bitter irony pervade 
So export centered is production that Namibia imports tinned 
meat (and even Irish meat to run its tinning plant), milk and 
both tinned and fresh fish. It is just one indicator of 
Namibia's position as an extreme colonial economy, indeed a 
virtual charicature of the pure model for such an economy.
How it was created
The early German compaigns were carried out primarily in 
pursuit of land for settlers - so effectively that today 
some 70% of the usable land is in the hands of white ranches 
and farms. The Germans were frank about what they were doing
"The decision to colonise in Southern Africa means 
nothing else than that the native tribes must withdraw 
from the lands on which they have pastured their cattle 
and so let the white man pasture his cattle on these 
self-same lands. If the moral rights of this standpoint 
are questioned, the answer is that for people of the 
cultural standard of the South African natives, the loss 
of their free natural barbarism and the development of 
a class of workers in the service of an dependent on whites 
is above all a law of survival of the highest order."
(To Be Born a Nation, page 17.)
With the available labour force in the centre and south 
of the country decimated by war, labourers were sought from 
the more established and densely populated Ovambo areas 
to the north. Previous studies by Richard Moorsom and 
Gervase Clarence Smith* have shown how the structure of 
Ovambo society and production was undermined by the 
availability of mass-produced goods and weapons from the 
capitalist countries, and their demand for ivory, slaves 
and, in the end, wage labour. With land stolen, population 
rising and independent, "subsistence" production in decline, 
the north came to depend on male workers leaving on term 
contracts for employment in the south. Women were forced 
to stay behind, and the resulting long hours of farm and 
domestic work, strain and lack of opportunities they suffer 
are perhaps too briefly examined in these works (pages 98-100 
of To Be Born a Nation being the clearest although R. Voipio's 
chapter in Namibia: The Last Colony examines contract labour's 
oppression of women and pp. 202, 210 contain liberation-oriented 
suggestions). Government spending has been minimal - between 1928 
and 1938 for example only 1.1 million rand was spent on all services fo
* "Underdevelopment and Class Formation in Ovamboland 1845- 
1915" Journal of African History, 16, 3, 1975.
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the about 260/000 African population. The 'reserves' 
now a 'residual sector', in the words of Namibia: The 
Last Colony - with 60% of all households fully or par tly 
engaged in subsistence agriculture which generates only 2% 
of Namibia's GDP. The low wages formed by the need for 
jobs and the transfer of household subsistence cost to 
the 'reserves' were essential to the white ranches (whose 
profitability was marginal even with state subsidy), and 
to the initial development of the mines.
The European discovery of diamonds in 1908 (and rediscovery* 
of marketable copper in 1906) summoned the first real inflow 
of large scale capital. The 1915 conquest of Namibia also 
provided South Africa with a new area to settle destitute 
Afrikaaner farmers being thrown off the land in South Africa 
by the crisis in small farm agriculture. Nevertheless, it 
was not until after World War Two that export production 
boomed, with the re-equipment and expansion of mines, 
the establishment of fishing and canning industry, and 
expansion of karakul farming.
The control of labour was formalised and intensified by 
the application of the full panoply of apartheid law to 
Namibia. Duncan Innes' NLC chapter links the whole process 
with the development of capitalism in South Africa itself.
* A pre-colonial industry mining and smelting copper to 
produce tools involving specialisation and long distance 
trade was destroyed when the German "Red Line" cut off 
the Ovambo smiths and traders from the Otavi area mines.
The colony was fully developed as a source of surplus 
and foreign exchange, and as a market for South African 
manufactures (for competitors are kept out behind high 
tariffs, and local manufacture is weak and geared to 
servicing export industries).
It is important for understanding of current political 
developments to recognise that, in the words of To Be 
Born a Nation "the class of exploiters presents extreme 
contrasts". On the one hand, the commercial ranching 
sector includes a substantial proportion of inefficient 
farms. All depend on continued state support and continued 
low wages without which they would operate at a loss. One 
fraction of their owners forms the backbone of the extreme 
right wing HNP. Many have been leaving the country, selling 
out farms to the new "ethnic authorities" and the small group 
of black councillors and officials who have been provided 
with money by South Africa - so much so that land prices in 
some areas are reported to have almost doubled during 1981, 
despite a devastating drought. Another largely German 
fraction appears to view life under an African government 
differently and are seeking to find means to accommodating.
On the other hand, the overwhelming source of surplus has 
been the highly capitalised mining industry - with a net 
operating surplus up from R97 million in 1975 to R455 million 
in 1979, whilst the wage bill only doubled to R106 million 
(Namibia in the 1980s). This sector of mining (though
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not necessarily the small mines) no longer depends on the 
low wage labour system - where once armies of men with 
shovels sifted diamondiferous gravels, huge machines now 
excavate. The wage bill is a small proportion of total 
mine costs, and during the 1970s mine wages have indeed 
risen sharply. While only Consolidated Diamond Mines 
now pays the so called "efficiency wage" (reasonable, 
fairly austere household consumption), the other two 
main groups (Rossing and Tsumeb) could readily afford 
to do so as demonstrated in To Be Born A Nation. 
Correspondingly, the huge transnational mining corporations 
do not depend on continued South African rule - they are 
to be seen supporting independence preferably under the 
private enterprise DTA, or even in the case of the diamond- 
mining company CDM attempting to remain neutral and allowing 
SWAPO to organise among the workforce - as SWAPO's 
To Be Born A Nation notes.
By 1982 mining was in considerable disarray. Political 
uncertainty suppresses new investment - "In particular, 
it is thought that Anglo American does not wish to invest 
in a new mining development prior to independence" as the 
(London) Mining Annual Review noted baldly. This is a 
readily understandable concern - major mines take five 
years to bring on stream and at least five more to 
recover capital costs. And SWAPO has made clear it views 
illegal post 1967 mines quite differently from previously 
established operations. This is compounded by a severe
slump in demand due to international recession, with 
several mines on a care-and-maintenance basis or closed, 
and diamond production cut back by virtually 50% between 
1978 and 1982 (probably a blessing for Namibia in conserving 
reserves but a present severe blow to state revenue).
The Dimensions of Theft
These books provide many measures of the impact on Namibians 
of the colonial suction-pump to which they are subjected. 
Perhaps the most telling is Namibia: The Last Colony's 
comparison with Tanzania: though Namibia's total per capita 
production is at least 6 times that of Tanzania, Africans 
in Namibia probably have a lower level of personal consumption 
and certainly a lower level of public services than do 
Tanzanians.
Examination of the breakdown of GDP is devastating.
From Shdwest Afrika to Namibia's most recent figures show 
50% going to company profits and another 10% to taxes on 
these profits. After whites have taken their salaries 
and other income, only 12% is left to black Namibians.
Lest it be thought this is an inevitable consequence of 
having a predominant, diamond-led, mineral sector, the 
roughly comparable figures for Botswana are 42% going to 
operating surplus (profits and taxes thereon), and 38% 
in wages and salaries to Botswana citizens. The apparent 
ratio between European and black per capita incomes is 
23:1, compared with perhaps 8:1 in Botswana or Zambia and 
15:1 even in South Africa itself.
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The outward orientation of the economy is equally extreme. 
Two-thirds of GDP (90% of physical goods) are exported, 
largely unprocessed. Correspondingly, most Namibian 
consumption, including half the grain requirements, are met 
by imports. Ninety per cent of directly productive invest­
ment is foreign owned. And, at the bottom line, over a 
third of GDP leaves the country annually, as the profits 
of the colonizers. (33% in 1979, compared with 27% in 
Botswana and under 5% in Zambia.)
The extraction of Namibia's physical resources has been 
plain theft in international law since the revocation of 
the South African mandate. The government of the United 
States (though not Britain) has recognised as much in 
informing its companies that it would not defend them 
against actions by the government of an independent 
Namibia. The indications are that mineral reserves are 
adequate for long term production, but inevitably the 
richest and most profitably extracted deposits tend to have 
been worked already: the companies have "plucked the eyes
of the land" (in the memorable phrase used to describe the 
settlement of the first Boer farmers around present day 
Lesotho) while not carrying out the proving and development 
of new reserves necessary to sustain steady future production 
levels.
The most serious plunder was wreaked on fish stocks. At 
its height, $120 million was earned a year and eight
processing plants were in operation at Walvis Bay plus 
two in Luderitz. Scientific reports on overfishing 
were ignored; by 1980 the catch was only a seventh of 
its 1968 peak and only two factories remained in operation. 
Several companies literally packed their machinery and 
left for Chile where new opportunities beckoned.
A serious problem for future development is the extra­
ordinarily low educational provision, and the lack of 
experienced skilled Namibians. Skilled jobs have been 
reserved for whites. Despite a burst of training activity 
by the large mines (not the state) since the late 1970s, 
this remains the dominant de facto position - in 1977 
93% of managerial and professional posts (except primary 
school teachers and nurses). Up to 1977 only 5,000 
Africans in the whole country had completed secondary 
school (compared, as Namibia in the 1980s and from 
Sttdwest Afrika to Namibia point out, with over 3,000 
refugees enrolled by SWAPO in secondary education abroad 
in 1981), and there is no university while students sent 
abroad (largely to "Bantu Universities") by the occupation 
regime and TNCs are far fewer than SWAPO sponsored tertiary 
level students.
The Human Effects of Theft
The lives of many black Namibians are organised by the 
contract labour system - 110,000 workers left their families 
to migrant to work; another 50-75,000 domestic workers and 
perhaps 25,000 seasonal farm and fishery employees are
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also paid far below minimum family subsistence levels.
The effects on their lives are detailed in quotations and
the results of questionnaire. A sombre, poignant, 1971/72
missionary booklet addressed to white employers "Contract
Work through Ovambo Eyes"is reprinted in Namibia: The Last Colony;
To Be Born A Nation's presentation (including citations of
worker manifestos) is far angrier in tone but the message
is the same. Poverty at home forces men to migrate and
women to desperately hard work; man and wife rarely see
each other, and human relationships are difficult and
strained. For the migrant, working and living conditions
are hard and brutal on farms and until recently in most
urban and mining jobs as well. A British journalist's
1973 description of the contract workers' compound outside
Windhoek is quoted by To Be Born a Nation (p.89):
"5,000 Ovambos are being housed in circumstances that 
would disgrace a 19th century prison. A visitor can only 
be appalled by the compounds' unrelieved bleakness - the 
barbed wire fences; the food being prepared with spades 
and pitch forks; above all, the over powering stench of 
urine which hangs over the compound."
On the isolated farms, housing is worse (indeed often non­
existent despite Namibia's blazing summers and cold winter 
nights) and arbitrary violence from the farmer a common 
experience.
Agriculture in the black 'reserves' is unrewarding and
precarious*. Crop yields are extremely low even in good 
years as is carrying capacity for animals. Drought can 
be devastating - by the end of 1981 drought had reduced 
cattle numbers by three quarters in the Kaokoveld and four 
fifths in Damaraland, compared with a quarter in the 
affected white areas, most of which quarter had been sold 
for slaughter at good prices rather than died.
The experience of colonialism has been divisive and 
debilitating; but it is clear from the statements of 
individuals, churches and parties that it has also 
stimulated a clear realisation of exploitation, and 
a determination to change. Even the one serious 
political economic analysis in favour of a neo-colonial 
solution** admits the history of exploitation and the 
need to reduce oppression, inequality and segregation if 
the productive heart of the colonial economy is to be
* For example, the Herero people have had the 'reserve' 
pushed north and east into the Kalahari desert fringe 
until now it is basically the Omeheke desert. That is 
exactly where von Trotha deliberately drove thousands 
of Herero to die of lack of water.
**W.H. Thomas, Economic Development in Namibia: Towards
Acceptable Development Strategies for Independent Namibia 
Kaiser Griinewald, Munich 1978 . (Acceptability to Namibian 
workers and peasants does not, it seems, rank high in 
Thomas's priorities or else he totally fails to grasp 
their perception of present and past reality.)
preserved. German Development Institute works,* while 
much more cautious in proposals than the present volumes, 
fully confirm their analysis of Namibia's economic past 
and present as one of gross exploitation, massive inequality, 
denial of basic human needs and unnecessary, damaging 
subordination to South African and foreign company interests.
THE COURSE OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE 
Breaking Contract
Contract in Namibia does not mean a business transaction. It is the 
legally authenticated slave labour/peasant subjugation system described 
above and in coldly biting political economic analysis (Namibia:
The Last Colony - Kiljunen and Green, From Sudwestafrika To Namibia), 
in poignant humanitarian appeal (Namibia: The Last Colony - Voipio)
and in controlled anger (To Be Born A Nation, esp. pp.59-85) in 
the recent volumes. Breaking contract, therefore, does not mean 
going back on ones word - it means human, social, economic and 
national liberation.
Contract built the political economy of theft, the socio-political 
system of repression and the politics of authoritarian exclusions 
which are occupied Namibia. It will also destroy them.
This is not simply a matter of resentment at exploitation or anger 
at maltreatment. The nature of contract has shaped the 
consciousness and key themes of the Namibian Liberation Movement.
Notably W.S. Barthold, Namibia's Economic Potential 
and Existing Economic Ties with the Republic of South 
Africa, 1977 and GDI, Multi-Sectoral Studv on Namibia, 
1978.
By forcing blacks to work as members of production teams it has 
given experience in social organisation of labour far wider than 
household production to most Namibians including most peasant 
families.
By forcing members of peasant households to go on contract to survive 
and even more by sending the 1971 strikers back to the rural areas - 
it has created an organic peasant/worker unity.
By bringing Namibians from all parts of the country into contact 
it has created the national vision and communication system 'reserves 
and 'bantustans' were meant to prevent.
By isolating workers in prison like compounds it has (for over a
decade) created no go areas in which the Liberation Movement has
space and time to organize and educate. As a perceptive CDM
executive put it, no better way of assisting SWAPO in recruiting 
could easily be imagined.
By forcing women to act as heads of households and to go into wage 
work it has created both an experience of deprivation and of self 
organisation which has been key to the very prominent role women 
play in SWAPO and the highly conscious work of these women to 
overcome their subordination.
By its very pervasiveness, contract has forced a broadening and 
deepening of the political economic and social consciousness of 
Namibians and a realisation that minor reforms or attacks on 
specific aspects of the system would lead nowhere - national 
liberation had to be total. That perception has been at the root 
of the dismal failure of South African efforts to buy a following
for the DTA or to forge a "third force" of "moderate" regional, 
ethnic and personality parties.
Toward "One Namibia, One Nation"
Namibia had been described in the South African press (quoted in 
From Sudwestafrika to Namibia p. 26) as:
" a country in waiting - waiting for SWAPO ... One 
of the most consistent trends I found in speaking 
to a wide range of Namibians representing all shades 
of the motley political and economic spectrum was 
an acceptance - sometimes eagerly expectant, sometimes 
resigned and fearful - that a SWAPO government is on 
the way. "
What is SWAPO? What is it likely to do? To these questions there 
can be few definitive answers. SWAPO is a broad front, national 
liberation movement which has not yet achieved power nor had to 
grapple with the day to day problems of running a newly independent
state. Yet some points are fairly clear.
To Be Born a Nation
SWAPO is national not tribal (a theme which comes through particularly 
strongly because it is more often implicit than explicit). The 
title of its volume comes from a Mozambican liberation slogan 
"to die a tribe and be born a nation" used to galvanize national
unity. SWAPO1s name for its country is Nama - "the shield",
referring to the Namib desert which so long defended the land 
against invaders. The date (August 26) on which it launched 
military action is the anniversary of the death of Samuel Maherero, 
the leader of the Herero war against the Germans. Contrary to 
assertions that 'SWAPO is Ovambo' its leaders and members came 
from all communities (even in a handful of cases the European) and
major Nama and Herero political groups dissolved to join SWAPO in 1976.
The First Day Of A Longer Journey
SWAPO is quite clear in its own mind that independence is a vital 
first step not a day or arrival - that black faces in political and 
decorative managerial posts mean less than nothing (Smith produced 
that and Nudge is trying) and black faces in all key posts with no 
other changes in the economy would replicate internal repression 
and continue external exploitation:
" But the first day of political independence cannot be 
the first day free from imperialist domination. That is 
a daydream. Namibians are under no illusions that 
the occupation regime will prove gracious in defeat. ...
Beyond the immediate aftermath of independence, the people's 
government will face a formidable task of national 
reconstruction and social reconstruction ... without 
[adequate] skilled manpower and technical resources ... 
management, marketing, technical expertise and know-how 
on big local operations ... international sources of 
finance and credit. "
(To Be Born A Nation, pp.295-6)
The dialogue and data collection/analysis toward defining parameters,
priorities, sequences and alternatives has begun - most evidently,
but by no means only, in the United Nations Institute for Namibia
seminars4" associated with the volumes in their Namibia Studies
Series.
*The one legitimate black party other than SWAPO - SWANU - is 
basically Herero in fact if not in name. It is a ghost of its 
former self, little more than a talking shop of isolated students 
sna intellectuals well aware it has no broad base or programme 
but still unwilling to accept that they have, as SWANU, "missed 
the bus" and dissolve into SWAPO.
“The most recent in April 1982 was on economic alternatives; the 
first in 1977 on person-power development. Others held include 
national language, constitutional choices, agriculture and education 
and others scheduled for 1982-83 include commerce and mining.
SWAPO has clearly chosen to concentrate on: a) building personnel
and data bases for use at independence and b) developing basic 
services for refugees and residents of semi-liberated areas {which 
does give experience and tests on what may be possible later in
rural Namibia as a whole). It would, after all, be rather foolish
to write a plan now - before adequate, up to date information is 
to hand, before independence, before full consultation with 
Namibians at home and so early as to tell opponents what strategy 
and moves they had to plan to thwart.
Toward Health With The People
In some respects the most completely elaborated policy and praxis 
is for health. The policy statement (SWAPO Political Programme, 
1976 reprinted p. 96 To Be Born A Nation) states:
" ... Shall strive for preventitive as well as curative 
medicine for all citizens:
a. comprehensive, free medical services ...
b. hospitals and clinics in every district ...
c. nurseries and clinics in every community for
working people and their families;
d. health education centres for preventitive 
medicine and family planning;
e. institutions for the training of medical 
and para-medical personnel;
f. rehabilitation centres for disabled and infirm 
persons;
g. an International Red Cross Society. ''
Here one can test words and actions - and the two square almost 
exactly. In Zambia and Angola SWAPO has acted on each of these 
points. Its medical service (doctors, paramedicals, nurses, aides, 
nursery personnel, administrative assistants) functions. It 
regularly places new entrants and experienced personnel in a 
variety of paramedical and medical courses. Namibian doctors
head the service. SWAPO (under the name of the UN Council for 
Namibia) is an active WHO member. On active research programme - 
including collecting data to estimate health parameters in Namibia* 
is being given priority as a basis for improving present services 
and laying the groundwork for their transferral on a national 
basis to Namibia.
The Political Economy of SWAPO
SWAPO is a socialist party and seeks a transition to socialism in 
Namibia:
Economic reconstruction in a free, democratic and 
united Namibia will have, as its motive force the 
establishment of a classless society. Thus social 
justice and progress for all is the governing idea 
behind every SWAPO policy decision.
- abolition of all forms of exploitation
- major means of production and exchange of the 
country are [in the] ownership of the people
- an integrated national economy
- land to the tiller
- agriculturally self sufficient
- a spirit of self reliance 7/
(SWAPO Political Programme, reprinted p. 196 
Namibia: The Last Colony)
Clearly what these statements mean depends most on proxis after 
independence, not just on words now. But the details stressed are 
interesting :
a. free trade unions;
b. basic services;
c. respect for honestly acquired private property;
*Probably unknown even to RSA and certainly unpublished - see 
cited GDI work.
+Eor a fuller exposition see pp.197-204 Namibia The Last Colony.
d. joint ventures, private sector (including for at 
least a time some present ranchers), co-operatives;
e. gradual changes on a negotiated basis if possible 
(even in respect to economic relations.
These suggest a set of priorities and sequences least dissimilar 
from Tanzania since 1967 (and Tanzania is after all negotiatincr 
a joint venture for the largest manufacturing plant in independent 
sub-saharan Africa as well as operating basically public sector 
import/export, 'wholesaling, finance and - less uniformly - 
manufacturing and plantation agriculture). This of course 
does assume the foreign firms will cooperate.
Certainly To Be Born A Nation's examples (pp.50-51) of change 
in the mining sector stress a tax share in profit similar to 
Botswana's levels (35% in Namibia now, 66-70% in Botswana in 
respect to diamonds). Their secondary theme is joint ventures. 
Similarly in his television interview at the 1981 Geneva Conference, 
SWAPO President Sam Nujoma was quite specific that while revised 
arrangements were essential Namibia would accept/need foreign 
company presence in several sectors for many years.
Breaking contract does require decent wages, working conditions 
and labour relations now. It also requires a plausible Namibian 
share - via taxes and joint ventures as well as land redistribution 
in surpluses. Similarly public utilities (now RSA owned) are 
seen as necessarily to be nationalized and a firm national economic 
policy central frame created. But much of this is policy in 
states as cautious as Botswana or Zambia and all of it is practice 
in states such as Algeria and Tanzania.
Human Rights and Participation
SWAPO does not assume that there cannot be Namibians of European 
ancestry. It does not assume that to the extent their higher 
incomes stem from more education, more experience or small business 
capital that they would be reduced to a national average. It 
does reject a system in which a white secondary school librarian 
receives $20,000 plus fringe benefits and a skilled black mineworker 
perhaps $3,000.
The SWAPO constitutional discussion paper (reproduced pp.102-3 
To Be Born A Nation) is very firm on the need for a Bill of Rights, 
anti-discrimination machinery (and ratification of the relevant 
UN Convention) and ratification of the two UN Covenants on Human 
Rights. That is a very different stance indeed from RSA practice 
at home or (directly and through DTA) in Namibia.
SWAPO's own operational style is as informative as its written 
proposals. It is collegiate and participatory - some friendly 
observers think almost to the extent (at times) of hindering 
prompt decision taking. A less dirigiste Party/civil government is 
not to be found in Africa and very few anywhere. To SWAPO the 
meaning of "democratic centralism" is that full and free discussion 
must preceede decisions and that - if situations change - they 
can be reopened in Party circles, but that once taken they must 
be carried out and, in public debate, supported by Party members.*
Evidently there are limitations on consultation and democracy 
during a war. But who caused a war? The 13 North American Colonies
*This is a perfectly reasonable reading of what Lenin wrote. If Krusch 
Tito and Enrico Berlinguer are to be believed it is not necessarily 
very close to actual practice in most European industralized socialist 
economies.
- 33 -
and the French sans culottes, objectively, had far fewer reasons to 
revolt than the people of Namibia. SWAPO has remained clear that "it is 
always politics which leads the gun" and "we do not beautify war as a 
purpose or regard it as a form of sport. We see war for what it is - an 
extension of politics by other means." (pp.168 and 262, To Be Born 
A Nation).
SWAP0 - Finance, Programme, Contacts
SWAPO is consistently accused of being Moscow-oriented or pup- 
peteered. Its statements lend little evidence to such a view; still 
less does the depth of church support in one of the world's most 
Christian countries. Nor does its list of fifteen diplomatic 
missions - eight in Africa (plus the provisional headquarters 
in Angola), two in Scandinavia, the United Nations, the UK,
Yugoslavia, Cuba and the German Democratic Republic. While SWAPO 
has deliberately avoided making firm statements about organisations, 
an independent Namibia would join beyond the Organisation of 
African Unity, the Southern African Development Coordination Con­
ference and the UN, plus its specialised agencies; its pattern of 
relations strongly implies early accession to the Commonwealth 
and (subject, one might suppose, to a satisfactory beef quota) 
to the ACP.
South Africa's own denunciation of SWAPO foreign finances and pro­
gramme is self-condemning. It asserts SWAPO receives $100million 
a year in support of PLAN - 90% supposedly supplied by Warsaw Pact 
states, Cuba, china and Yugoslavia. It implies that the civilian 
programme receives comparable assistance - 70% from western and 
non-aligned states. The surprising point is not the source of 
military assistance - where else can SWAPO turn, and how large 
dees it lock against semi-official South African estimates cf
$1,000 million Namibian war expenditure (plus $200 million to 
bribe ranchers and 'bantustan' employees)? Rather, it is that on
South Africa's own admission, SWAPO1s civil government expenditure
is of an equal order of magnitude and financed from a very broad 
range of sources - notably Scandinavian ones.
Which Side Are You On?
Namibia's condition is not one which should leave observers
neutral. For Namibians there is no option of neutrality. As the
main southern leaders (led by Hendrik Witbooi, grandson of the
Nama national resistance hero) declared when they joined SWAPO in
1976 (quoted pp 234-6, To Be Born a Nation):
'A Now there are only two plateforms left: the national 
movement, SWAPO, or Turnhalle. We asked ourselves:
Who repressed, persecuted, humiliated, liquidated 
and betrayed us; was it SWAPO or the Boers and their 
allies? r
Since 1976 the buying of bantustan staff and homeguards and the
complusory conscription of blacks to fight against the liberation
movement have made the choice even starker. To paraphrase the
words of a USA mineworkers organising song:
Which side are you on boys? Which side are you on?
They say in Namibia, boys, there are no neutrals there;
You either are a SWAPO man or a pawn of the RSA.
For outsiders, there may be more choices - and less willingness to 
take a stand,even though our freedom and lives (unlike those of 
Namibians) can hardly be endangered by our stands. One argument 
has been to give South Africa time. As Prime Minister Vorster 
said - "give us six months and we will amaze the world." But that 
was 1974. For 35 years South Africa has been in open, legal 
violation of its obligations to the United Nations in respect to 
Namibia; for nearly 16 (since the revocation of the Mandate) its 
presence has constituted armed aggression and a threat to the peac
within the meaning of the Charter. (The dead and maimed and im­
prisoned thousands of Namibians and Angolans know how real that 
'threat' is.)
Another is the claim that South Africa is the beleagured defender 
of Western Christian Democracy, our ally in war. The present 
leaders of the Republic are no such thing - as Toivo ya Toivo said 
in the dock (quoted p.315, To Be Born a Nation):
x During the Second World War, when it became evident that 
both my country and yours were threatened by the dark 
clouds of Nazism, I risked my life to defend both of them 
... But some of your countrymen ... resorted to sabotage 
against their own fatherland. I volunteered to face 
German bullets, and as a guard of military installations 
both in South West Africa and the Republic, was prepared 
to be victim of their sabotage. Today they are our masters 
and are considered the heroes, and I am called the coward. "
The record on democracy of South Africa needs no rehearsing, and
contrasts sharply with that of SWAPO. As to Christianity, South
Africa has twice blown up'the main Lutheran press at Onipa as
well as the Anglican St Mary's theological seminary, and deported
a score of clergy, including three bishops. SWAPO's refugee
camps have pastors, chaplains and lay readers and build churches
with their own hands. Small wonder a Lutheran leader stated (quoted
p.283, To Be Born a Nation):
M The Freedom Fighters are our children. Even people who are 
suffering still give them food because they know the free­
dom fighters are the people who come from us, who are 
fighting for our freedom - and we've got to help them.
or that the World Lutheran Federation at its World Assembly in
Dar es Salaam stated that support for apartheid placed one in
"status confessionis" (mortal sin) - a decision opposed only by the
white South African and Namibian Lutheran Churches.
South Africa is vulnerable. It needs to import petroleum; it needs 
business partners to provide high technology (not least for 
weapons production); it now has to borrow over $4,000 million a
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year from banks and the IMF. Banks, coporations, governments, the 
IMF - these are the external arteries and pressure points of 
apartheid. South Africa does respond to pressure. When its 
attempt to obscure the involvement of serving security and military 
personnel in the 1981 Seychelles mercenary coup attempt was met 
by the warning that the USA, UK, France and Federal Germany would 
invoke the air piracy convention, and block services to and from 
RSA, the Republic retreated, despite the highly damaging revelations 
at the ongoing air hijacking trial. The vehemence and sustained 
energy of its attacks on bodies like the World Council of Churches 
(partially revealed in Muldergate fallout) also indicate its real 
fear that they may mobilise Western pressures it cannot simply 
reject.
For those concerned to act, the list of SWAPO missions and of 
support groups at the end of To Be Born a Nation gives one starting 
point - and their own churches, trade unions, women's groups and 
political parties another.
There will never be a clearer moral case for taking a stand than 
Namibia. True, it is "a small and far away country", but the sequel 
to Neville Chamberlain's use of those words to justify his sanc­
tioning of the rape and murder of Czechoslovakia, should give 
pause to advocates of benign neglect or appeasement of South Africa. 
The more appropriate words are those of the late Angolan President, 
A.gostino Neto:
So comes the moment 
To advance resolutely 
To build the world, which belongs 
To all human beings.
London, England, and 
Arusha, Tanzania 
May 1, 1982
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